

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

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O 131219Z DEC 74

FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9100

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 BANGKOK 19511

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS SECDEF AND CINCPAC

CINCPAC PLEASE PASS AMBASSADOR KINTNER

E.O. 11652 GDS

TAGS: MOPS, TH

SUBJ: FOLLOW-UP TO VISIT BY DEPUTY SECRETARY CLEMENTS - PART III

- RESPONSE TO KRIANGSAK PAPER ON MILITARY ASSISTANCE NEEDS

REF: A. BANGKOK 18617

B. BANGKOK 18881

C. TAIPEI 7174

D. SEOUL 8259

1. IN OCTOBER 1 DISCUSSIONS WITH RTG MINISTER OF DEFENSE GENERAL KHRUAN AND ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER CHATCHAI, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WILLIAM P. CLEMENTS UNDERTOOK TO RESPOND TO PAPER PRESENTED BY GENERAL KRIANGSAK CHOMANAN WITH REGARD TO FUTURE RTG MILITARY ASSISTANCE REQUIREMENTS (COPY SENT DEPT WITH LETTER BOEHM-ROBERTS DATED OCT 7, 1974). IN ORDER PROVIDE BASIS FOR THAT RESPONSE, HOPEFULLY AT EARLY DATE, EMBASSY-MACHTAI WORKING GROUP HAS RESEARCHED PROBLEM AND MADE RECOMMENDATIONS TO DEPARTMENT REGARDING WEAPONS AND SPARE PARTS REQUIREMENTS (REF A). WE HAVE ALSO TRANSMITTED FINDINGS AS TO OPTIONS OPEN TO RTARF TO MEET INCREASED PORTION OF NEEDS BY EXISTING AND PROPOSED IN-COUNTRY AND/OR REGIONAL PRODUCTION (REF B). WASHINGTON'S RESPONSES IN THESE AREAS WILL IN EFFECT CONSTITUTE RESPONSE TO LARGE PORTION OF KRIANGSAK PAPER.

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2. SINCE MID-60'S WE HAVE, LARGELY IN ORDER TO SECURE RTG SUPPORT FOR USG OBJECTIVES IN LAOS, CAMBODIA, AND NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAM, SUPPLIED TO RTARF A VAST INVENTORY OF WEAPONS, VEHICLES, AIRCRAFT AND EQUIPMENT WHICH, BECAUSE OF RELATIVELY LOW DENSITY OF INDIVIDUAL ITEMS TOGETHER WITH LOW-LEVEL OF INDUSTRIAL TECHNOLOGY IN THAILAND, COULD FOR MOST PART BE SUPPORTED ONLY FROM MILITARY OR COMMERCIAL SOURCES ABROAD. AS RESULT, OPERATING AND MAINTENANCE (O&M) COSTS OVER YEARS CONSUMED INCREASINGLY LARGE INCREMENTS OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM EACH YEAR, REACHING ALMOST 50 PERCENT IN FY71-72 WHEN MISSION FORMULATED PLAN TO TRANSFER THESE COSTS GRADUALLY TO RTG BUDGET.

3. AS RESULT NEW PLANNING, FY72-73 PROGRAMS SET IN MOTION SCHEME FOR RTG TO ASSUME ALL O&M COSTS BY 1980, AND EMBASSY/MACHTAI ARE CURRENTLY TARGETTING (BUT HAVE NOT YET PUT IN PROGRAM) ADVANCING PHASE-OUT DATE TO FY 1977.

4. RTG WAS, OF COURSE, CAUGHT UNAWARE BY SUDDEN REDUCTION IN MAP IN FY 1973 (TO LESS THAN ONE-HALF THAT GRANTED IN FY 1973) ESPECIALLY AT TIME WHEN RTG MILITARY EXPENDITURE WAS RISING TO \$319.7 MILLION IN 1973 FROM \$218 MILLION IN 1970 AND \$93.9 MILLION IN 1965. IN THAT SITUATION, SHARP REDUCTION IN FY73 AND FY74 MAP ALLOCATIONS RESULTED IN CUTS IN O&M AS WELL AS INVESTMENT FUNDING. IT WAS IN THIS CONTEXT THAT DEFMIN KHRUAN AND ACTING FONMIN CHATCHAI (A) ASKED DEPUTY SECRETARY CLEMENTS FOR ASSISTANCE IN SECURING SPARE PARTS AS WELL AS ADDITIONAL AND REPLACEMENT WEAPONS (DESPITE FACT THAT O&M COSTS ACCOUNT FOR ALMOST 30 PERCENT OF FY75 MAP, DEPOT SHELVES ARE NEARLY BARE), AND (B) STRESSED NEED FOR HELPING RTARF BECOME MORE SELF-SUFFICIENT IN PRODUCTION OF WEAPONS, AMMUNITION, AND SPARE PARTS.

5. OBVIOUSLY SELF-SUFFICIENCY OBJECTIVE RUNS COUNTER TO FACT THAT SOME WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT SOUGHT BY THAIS CANNOT BE SUPPORTED COST-EFFECTIVELY BY THE THAI INDUSTRIAL BASE WITHIN FORESEEABLE FUTURE. HOWEVER, WE CAN PUSH THE RTARF TOWARD GREATER SELF-SUFFICIENCY IN MANY IMPORTANT AREAS, AND IN THAT WAY HOPE TO COMPENSATE FOR CERTAIN BUILT-IN

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O&M ITEMS WHICH MUST BE OBTAINED ABROAD (WHETHER AS GRANT AID OR BY PURCHASE).

6. AGAINST FOREGOING BACKGROUND, PARAS 7-10 SET FORTH EMBASSY/MACHTAI RECOMMENDATIONS FOR USG RESPONSE TO KRIANGSAK PAPER.

7. WE THINK IT INADVISABLE TO REPLY TO THE ENTIRE KRIANGSAK

LETTER POINT-BY-POINT, SINCE THIS WOULD NECESSITATE SAYING "NO," OR MISLEADING THE THAIS, ON SUBJECTS ON WHICH IT WOULD BE MORE PRUDENT FOR US SIMPLY TO REMAIN SILENT. ALSO SOME ASPECTS OF THE LETTER ARE REPETITIVE, AND BEST DEALT WITH IN SINGLE RESPONSE. FOR EXAMPLE, MUCH OF IT DEALS WITH O&M COSTS FOR VARIOUS ARMED SERVICES, UNDER INDIVIDUAL SERVICE HEADINGS. WE SUGGEST THAT RESPONSE HERE BE LIMITED TO AN UNDERTAKING TO ALLOCATE SIGNIFICANT PORTION OF AVAILABLE MAP TO O&M COSTS IN FY 75 AND FY 76, BUT MAKE CLEAR THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE RTARF MOVE PROMPTLY TO IMPLEMENT PLANS TO PHASE O&M DOWN AND OUT SO FAR AS MAP IS CONCERNED.

8. RESPONSE COULD PROVIDE AS RATIONALE FACT THAT MAP FUNDS ARE BEING REDUCED AS RESULT US DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL NEEDS, WITH RESULT THAT USG IS MOVING WORLD-WIDE TO GET OUT OF O&M AREA IN FAVOR OF INVESTMENT ITEMS IN SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS, ADDING THAT ORIGINAL USG CONCEPT ENVISIONED ASSUMPTION OF INCREASINGLY LARGE SHARE OF DEFENSE BURDEN BY ALLIES WHOSE ECONOMIES DEVELOP AT THE PACE AND LEVEL EVIDENT IN THAILAND OVER LAST DECADE, AND PARTICULARLY IN LAST FIVE YEARS.

NOTE BY OCT: NOT PASSED ABOVE ADDRESSEES.

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FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 BANGKOK 19511

EXDIS

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9. IN RESPONSE TO THE REQUEST FOR SUPPORT FOR "HUMANITARIAN" AND MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS TO "IMPROVE US IMAGE" AS

WELL AS TO ENLARGE POOL OF RTA MEDICAL SKILLS, IT APPEARS THAT WITH LIMITED MAP FUNDS AVAILABLE, IT WILL BE UP TO RTARF TO DECIDE ON PRIORITY TO BE ACCORDED SUCH ASSISTANCE IN COMPETITION WITH OTHER OBJECTIVES. NEVERTHELESS, WE CAN ENVISION OTHER CHANNELS THROUGH WHICH SUCH OBJECTIVES MIGHT BE ACCOMPLISHED:

(A) PARTICIPATION (MAINLY FUNDING) IN MEDICAL CIVIC ACTION OR TRAINING PROGRAMS MIGHT APPEAL TO UK, AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND COLLEAGUES IN SEATO; USG WOULD BE PREPARED TO SUPPORT RTG RECOMMENDATION THAT SEATO UNDERTAKE SUCH PROGRAMS;

(B) USOM HAS INFORMED RTG HEALTH MINISTRY THAT LOANS AT CONCESSIONAL RATES MIGHT BE AVAILABLE FOR TRAINING AND DEPLOYMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH WORKERS IN RURAL AREAS, DEPENDING ON SIZE AND NATURE OF PROGRAM;

(C) NINE OIL COMPANIES, MOSTLY US, PROSPECTING IN GULF OF SIAM HAVE ALL ESTABLISHED, AS PART OF CONCESSION AGREEMENTS WITH RTG, SCHOLARSHIP FUNDS TOTALLING SEVERAL MILLION DOLLARS FOR TRAINING THAI STUDENTS IN ALL DISCIPLINES AT UNIVERSITIES IN THAILAND AND ABROAD. RTA COULD TRAIN ADDITIONAL MILITARY DOCTORS IN EXISTING UNIVERSITIES, USING THESE SCHOLARSHIP FUNDS, MOST OF WHICH ARE ADMINISTERED BY RTG. IN INSTANCES WHERE OIL COMPANIES ADMINISTER SCHOLAR-
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SHIP PROGRAMS, USG WOULD BE PREPARED TO URGE US FIRMS TO SELECT REASONABLE NUMBER OF MILITARY CANDIDATES TO PURSUE MEDICAL STUDIES EACH YEAR.

10. IT IS EVIDENT, HOWEVER, THAT SOME PARTS OF LETTER MUST BE ANSWERED IN GREATER DETAIL. WE HAVE KEYED PROPOSED RESPONSES TO SPECIFIC PARAGRAPHS OF KRIANGSAK LETTER FOR READY IDENTIFICATION, BUT SUGGEST THAT FORMAL RESPONSE TO RTG NOT USE SUCH FORMAT.

A. BEGIN QUOTE

5.2.1.2. A NEED EXISTS (IN RTA) FOR ADDITIONAL ARMS AND EQUIPMENT FOR THOSE UNITS WHICH ARE SHORT, AND REQUIREMENTS EXIST TO REPLACE CERTAIN ITEMS SO THAT UNITS ARE FULLY EQUIPPED WITH SUFFICIENT MODERN WEAPONS TO ASSIST IN DEVELOPING THE ARMY'S CAPABILITIES IN ITS UNCONVENTIONAL FIGHT TO SUPPRESS INSURGENCY. END QUOTE

COMMENT: THE MAIN PRIORITY FOR THAILAND MAP IS TO IMPROVE THAI ARMED FORCES AS AN EFFECTIVE MILITARY FORCE, WITH EMPHASIS ON THOSE ACTIVITIES WHICH SUPPORT COUNTER-INSURGENCY. THE REDUCTION IN THE FY73 AND FY74 MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS TOTALED \$50.4 MILLION OF WHICH \$35.8 WAS FOR INVESTMENT ITEMS, MAINLY UNIT FILL EQUIP-

MENT AND ATTRITION REPLACEMENTS. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THIS REQUEST IS LEGITIMATE. DEPUTY SECRETARY CLEMENTS TOLD DEFMIN KHRUAN AND DEPFONMIN CHATCHAI HE BELIEVED THE USG COULD PROVIDE ADDITIONAL HELP IN THIS AREA.

B. BEGIN QUOTE

5.2.1.3. THE RTA MUST INCREASE MANPOWER TO FULL CAPACITY PARTICULARLY IN ARMY AREAS 2 AND 3, AND IN THE SOUTH; THE 2ND AND 9TH DIVISIONS MUST BE BEEFED UP SO THAT THEY WILL BE ABLE TO FACE THREATS WHICH ARE RAPIDLY DEVELOPING. END QUOTE.

COMMENT: THIS APPEARS TO BE, IN PART, THE EXPANSION OF THE RTA FROM 5 2/3 TO 7 1/3 DIVISIONS. THE EXPANSION IS SECRET

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ESTIMATED TO COST \$56.9 MILLION IN I-COST ITEMS ALONE AND THE EXISTING MAP CANNOT SUPPORT THE PROPOSED EXPANSION. PART OF THIS REQUEST IS BASED ON THE RTG DESIRE TO FILL THE TOE FOR THE NINTH DIVISION, AS WE PROMISED TO DO PROVIDED THE NINTH LEFT MUCH OF ITS DIVISIONAL EQUIPMENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM WHEN THE DIVISION REDEPLOYED TO THAILAND IN 1971-72. WE FULFILLED MOST OF THIS OBLIGATION, BUT IN EFFECT WALKED AWAY FROM THE REMAINING PART OF OUR UNDERTAKING IN REGARD TO EQUIPMENT VALUED AT \$2.877 MILLION (BANGKOK 13616 AUG 31, 1973), AND PRECEDING). THE JSOP FOR 1978-79 ENVISIONS SUPPORT FOR THE SECOND DIVISION. HOWEVER, AS RESULT OF THE DETERIORATING SITUATION IN CAMBODIA, RTG HOPES TO ACTIVATE SECOND IN CY 1975 AND TO INTERPOSE IT BETWEEN BANGKOK AND CAMBODIAN BORDER.

C. BEGIN QUOTE

5.2.2.3. NEED ARMS AND EQUIPMENT FOR THE MARINE CORPS WHICH IS BEING ORGANIZED FOR CI OPERATIONS. END QUOTE

COMMENT: ASSUMING FY 1976 GRANT AID PROGRAM OF AT LEAST \$40 MILLION, \$1.846 MILLION IS PROGRAMMED IN FY76 FOR TOE EQUIPMENT FOR ONE MARINE BATTALION, MAINLY WEAPONS, VEHICLES AND COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT.

D. BEGIN QUOTE

5.2.3.2. (RTAF) NEED ASSISTANCE IN TERMS OF AIRCRAFT AND HELICOPTERS FOR USE IN CI SUPPRESSION, SUCH AS THE OV-10 AND EC-47. END QUOTE

COMMENT: IT APPEARS THAT WE WILL BE ABLE TO SUPPLY THE

EC-47'S AS PROMISED. THE THAI CLEARLY ARE OPTIMISTIC ABOUT OBTAINING THE OV-10 SQUADRON AS A RESULT OF TALKING WITH DEPUTY SECRETARY CLEMENTS. WE HOPE REPLY TO KRIANGSAK'S PAPER WILL BEET THAI EXPECTATIONS.

NOTE BY OCT: NOT PASSED ABOVE ADDRESSEES.

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9102

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EXDIS

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E. BEGIN QUOTE

5.2.3.3. ASSISTANCE (TO RTAF) IS REQUIRED TO DEVELOP A UNIT WHICH IS CAPABLE OF PERFORMING JET (GAS TURBINE) ENGINE MAINTENANCE AT THE 3RD AND 4TH ECHELONS. END QUOTE

COMMENT: THE JET (GAS TURBINE) GENGINE OVERHAUL FCILITY AT DON MUANG IS ONE OF THE MAJOR SELF-SUFFICIENCY UNDERTAKING SUPPORTED IN THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (FY75-78), AT A COST OF ALMOST \$3 MILLION. REPAIRS ARE CURRENTLY BEING CARRIED OUT ON UH-1H, OV-10, AND AU-23 ENGINES. COMPLETE OVERHAUL CAPABILITY WILL BE ACHIEVED IN FY 1979-80.

F. BEGIN QUOTE

5.2.4. SUPREME COMMAND HEADQUARTERS REQUIRES ASSISTANCE IN TERMS OF EXPENDITURE FOR OPERATIONS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY CENTER, JOINT INTELLIGENCE CENTER, AND COMMUNICATIONS CENTER. WHAT IS NEEDED ARE SPARE PARTS FOR VEHICLES, TELECOMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT FOR SUPPORT IN CI SUPPRESSION, AND ROUTINE

OPERATIONS.

COMMENT: IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE JANUARY 1973 AGREEMENT BETWEEN AMBASSADOR UNGER AND FOREIGN MINISTER THANOM, WE ARE NOW IN PROCESS OF PROCURING TELECOMMUNICATIONS EQUIP-
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MENT FOR THE SIGNAL DIVISION OF THE ARMED FORCES SECURITY CENTER, AND WE ARE PROGRAMMING MAP SUPPORT TO THE SUPREME COMMAND SIGNAL BATTALION AND TO MOD INTELLIGENCE UNITS THROUGH FY1979. WE HAVE JUST COMPLETED A SURVEY TO BETTER ASSESS FUTURE EQUIPMENT NEEDS WITH A VIEW TO UPGRADING THAI CAPABILITIES (NSA CAN PROVIDE FURTHER INFORMATION ON THIS PROGRAM IF NEEDED). WE ESTIMATE COSTS FOR THE THREE NEW CENTERS LISTED ABOVE WOULD BE ABOUT \$2.5 MILLION.

G. BEGIN QUOTE

6.3 ESTABLISH FACILITIES TO PRODUCE SPARE PARTS FOR THE TYPES OF ARMS AND EQUIPMENT NOW BEING GIVEN SO THAT THE THAI ARMED FORCES CAN EVENTUALLY PRODUCE THEM. THIS WILL HELP TO MAINTAIN EQUIPMENT ECONOMICALLY AT THE LEVELS REQUIRED FOR COMBAT PREPAREDNESS. END QUOTE

COMMENT: IN FACE OF LOW DENSITY OF MANY ITEMS PLUS LOW LEVEL OF INDUSTRIAL TECHNOLOGY IN THAILAND, COMPLETE SELF-SUFFICIENCY IN SENSE OF DOMESTIC ABILITY TO PRODUCE ALL PARTS AND EQUIPMENT TO SUPPORT MAP-SUPPLIED INVESTMENT ITEMS IS SIMPLY NOT PRACTICAL FOR THAILAND. IT IS, HOWEVER, LIKELY THAT THE SELF-SUFFICIENCY BASE CAN BE BROADENED SIGNIFICANTLY, AND THE US MISSION HAS BEEN REVIEWING THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM WITH THAT OBJECTIVE IN MIND. IN THAT REGARD, THE RTARF MAINTENANCE EXPERIENCE HAS IN ALL LIKELIHOOD IDENTIFIED SPECIFIC TYPES OF EQUIPMENT AND WEAPONS, OR PARTS, ESPECIALLY AUTOMOTIVE PARTS, FOR WHICH THE DEMAND IS SUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY PRODUCTION IN THAILAND. THIS IS TYPE OF PROBLEM WHICH WILL BE DISCUSSED WITH MINISTRY OF DEFENSE IN REGARD TO ACHIEVING GREATER DEGREE OF SELF-SUFFICIENCY FOR RTARF. HOPEFULLY, ONCE PRODUCTION POSSIBILITIES ARE IDENTIFIED, USG CAN ASSIST BY SEEKING US INVESTORS TO FORM JOINT VENTURES WITH THAI PARTNERS FOR SPECIFIC PROJECTS.

H. BEGIN QUOTE

6.4 EXPAND FACILITIES AND CAPABILITIES TO GIVE THE THAI ARMED FORCES THE CAPABILITY TO REPAIR/BUKLD MOTOR VEHICLES.
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THIS WILL HELP TO LOWER THE RATE OF INOPERABLE VEHICLES
DUE TO LACK OF SPARE PARTS OR HAVING BEEN SENT FOR REPAIR
ABROAD. END QUOTE

COMMENT: THE ROYAL THAI ARMY REBUILD FACILITY (RTARP) AT
KORAT IS DESIGNED TO OVERHAUL 100 TRACK AND 2000 WHEELED
VEHICLES PER YEAR. IT WILL BEGIN OPERATING IN 1975 AT A BREAKING-
IN RATE OF 240 VEHICLES ANNUALLY. ALL PRODUCTION EQUIPMENT WAS
PROVIDED THROUGH MAP AT COST OF \$2.8 MILLION, AS WAS THE STOCKAGE
OF REPAIR PARTS (TO INCLUDE \$1.6 MILLION IN FY74). THE CAPACITY
OF THIS FACILITY EMPLOYING ONLY SINGLE WORK SHIFT EXCEEDS THE
PROJECTED REQUIREMENTS FOR ALL SERVICES AND THE RTG MIGHT
THEREFORE WISH TO CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF A CO-PRODUCTION
AGREEMENT TO REBUILD VEHICLES WITH OTHER GOVERNMENTS IN SEA,
AND TO CONSIDER OPERATING THE PLANT ON THE BASIS OF TWO, OR EVEN
THREE, WORK SHIFTS.

1. ACTION REQUESTED: THE MISSION IS AWARE THAT THE ABILITY
OF THE UNITED STATES TO RESPOND TO THE MAJOR PART OF THE
REQUESTS CONTAINED IN THE KRIANGSAK PAPER IS CONSTRAINED BY
NORMAL US BUDGETARY PROCEDURES, LIMITATIONS UPON DISPOSAL
OF EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLES, AND OTHER STATUTORY LIMITATIONS.
WITHIN THOSE LIMITS, HOWEVER, DISCRETION DOES EXIST WITHIN
THE USG. WE ARE NOT NOW ABLE TO ANTICIPATE EXACTLY WHAT
THAILAND'S CURRENT OR FUTURE SHARE OF APPROPRIATED MAP,
FMS CREDITS AND EDA WILL BE, ALTHOUGH WE (AND ALSO THE
THAI) ARE RECONCILED TO THE PROSPECT THAT GRANT AID, AT
LEAST, WILL DIMINISH. WE HOPE, HOWEVER, THAT IN THE
PROCESS OF ALLOCATING WHATEVER GRANT MAP CONGRESS DOES
APPROPRIATE, AS WELL AS IN THE DISPOSITION OF EDA AND IN
THE ALLOCATION OF FMS CREDITS, WASHINGTON WILL BEAR IN
MIND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN US ASSISTANCE TO THAILAND
AND THAI COOPERATION IN THE PURSUIT OF US OBJECTIVES
HERE.

12. THE AMBASSADOR EXPECTS TO CALL OF DEFENSE MINISTER
KHURAN, POSSIBLY AS EARLY AS NEXT WEEK. THE MAIN SUBJECT
OF THIS DISCUSSION WILL BE SELF-SUFFICIENCY, INCLUDING
A SUGGESTION THAT THE RTARP SEND TEAMS TO SOUTH KOREA AND
TAIWAN TO INVESTIGATE POSSIBILITIES FOR CO-PRODUCTION AND TRADE-
OFFS OF WEAPONS, PARTS AND EQUIPMENT. IN ADDITION, HOWEVER,
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WE HAVE BEEN REMINDED ON SEVERAL RECENT OCCASIONS THAT KHURAN
IS AWAITING A RESPONSE TO THE KRIANGSAK PAPER AS A WHOLE.

13. IT WILL THEREFORE BE HELPFUL IF BY EARLY NEXT WEEK WE HAVE
(A) SOME INDICATION OF HOW WASHINGTON PLANS TO FOLLOW
THROUGH ON SECRETARY CLEMENTS' STATEMENT THAT THE US COULD HELP
THAILAND WITH THE SPARE PARTS AND OBSOLETE WEAPONS PROBLEM
(REF A); (B) PRELIMINARY COMMENTS ON OUR APPROACH TOWARD SELF-
SUFFICIENCY (REF B); AND (C) WASHINGTON'S RESPONSE TO THE
KRIANGSAK PAPER, EVEN IF ONLY IN TENTATIVE FORM. IN THIS
CONNECTION IT WOULD BE PARTICULARLY HELPFUL IF AT LEAST A
FEW SPECIFIC ITEMS COULD BE DEALT WITH, SUCH AS OV-10'S.
MASTERS

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